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1. Introduction 
Trade creation and diversion have been key concepts in considering the economic 
effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs). Viner (1950) performed a pioneering study 
of these concepts, although they were discussed in the context of customs unions. 
Originally, the trade creation effects refer to the start of product imports, which were 
previously not imported, from an RTA member country. Trade diversion means the 
stoppage of product imports from an RTA non-member country by starting to import 
these products from a member country instead. Such a switch may happen, even if the 
before-tax prices from the RTA non-members are cheaper than those from RTA 
members, because RTA members enjoy lower RTA preferential tariff rates than the 
general tariff rates (e.g., most-favored-nation (MFN) rates). Trade diversion has long 
been regarded as one of the consequences of the notorious “evils” associated with RTAs. 
Researchers have tried to quantify these effects, since they play a crucial role in 
evaluating the total impact of RTAs. 
There are several ex–post empirical studies on trade creation and diversion.1 
These studies mostly estimate the gravity equation by employing aggregated trade data 
at the country level (or country-sector level). Recent examples include Soloaga and 
Winters (2001), Magee (2008), Carrere (2006), Dai et al. (2014), and Yang and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2014). These studies differ, particularly by estimation techniques. 
For example, while Carrere (2006) employs the Hausman–Taylor estimation technique, 
the multinomial Poisson maximum likelihood estimation is used in Yang and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2014). These studies introduce various RTA dummy variables into 
gravity equations to differentiate the trade creation and trade diversion effects. In 
particular, Magee (2008) carefully defines these effects and quantifies their absolute 
values.2 As a result, Magee finds that the trade creation effect led to an increase in 
intra-bloc trade by 89% after RTAs were in place for 18 years and there was little 
evidence of trade diversion. Also, Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) conduct a 
meta-analysis of 85 such studies and conclude that trade creation effects exist and they 
                                                   
1 As summarized by Magee (2008), another strand is the ex-ante studies. A typical approach is a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulation. In particular, many studies based on CGE 
models use variations of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. Examples of this 
approach include Brown et al. (1995), Cox (1995), Sobarzo (1995), and the studies surveyed by 
Baldwin and Venables (1995). There are also some studies that employ a simpler approach, which is 
based on the partial equilibrium model. Those studies include Karemera and Ojah (1998), Wylie 
(1995), and Kreinin and Plummer (1992). Although the estimates in these studies are severely 
affected by the assumption of exogenous parameters such as demand elasticity, all papers show 
certain amounts of the absolute values derived from trade diversion. 
2 Clausing (2001) directly examines the effects of tariff reduction through RTAs on trade. 
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are significant. 
Against this backdrop, our paper is the first to examine trade creation and 
diversion at the firm level. A firm-level analysis provides microeconomic insights on 
trade creation and diversion. The Vinerian version is derived basically from a simplistic 
international trade model for a homogenous good under perfect competition. Thus, in 
the Viner model, we do not need to introduce any firm-level perspectives. However, a 
firm-level analysis clarifies the detailed effects of RTAs on firm-level imports that have 
never been investigated. This paper focuses on an interesting case from the viewpoint of 
trade creation and diversion, specifically on firm-product pairs, in which firms import a 
particular product from non-members but not from RTA members. In such firm-product 
pairs, we define firm-level trade creation as the start of imports from RTA members 
under RTA schemes. The firm-level trade diversion is simply defined as the termination 
of imports from RTA non-members.3 As mentioned above, this definition is slightly 
different from the Vinerian version’s definition of trade creation and diversion. For 
example, the original definition of trade creation refers to the start of product imports, 
which were formerly not imported at all. On the other hand, the target of our firm-level 
trade creation study is firms that used to import from non-members. In short, our 
interest lies in firm-level switching from the imports of a particular product from 
non-members to those from members under RTA schemes. 
Specifically, using shipment-level import data for Thailand during the period 
2007–2011, we quantitatively and qualitatively investigate such firm-(product-)level 
switching of import sources. Our quantitative analysis examines how much switching is 
observed in Thailand’s imports and presents some important findings, which cannot be 
obtained from country-level analyses of trade creation/diversion. For example, we can 
investigate whether new importers simply started their importing activities per se or 
switched their import sources from non-members to RTA members. Similarly, it is 
possible to examine whether the termination of imports from non-members was the 
result of simply stopping their importing activity per se or switching their import 
sources to RTA members. On the other hand, one objective of our qualitative analysis is 
to investigate the determinants of firm-level trade creation and diversion. In particular, 
we shed light on the roles of MFN rates and RTA rates in the importing country, i.e., 
Thailand. We present unique empirical evidence that these tariff rates have symmetric 
effects on firm-level trade creation and diversion, as defined above. In addition to such 
                                                   
3 More specifically, we define these firm-level trade creations and diversions at the firm-product 
level, but we use the terms firm-level trade creation and diversion for brevity.  
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“extensive margins” of imports from RTA members and non-members, we further 
investigate the role of “intensive margins,” i.e., the magnitude of imports from RTA 
members and non-members. 
Our dataset enables us to identify the tariff schemes used for each import 
shipment.4 It covers all commodity imports for Thailand and includes information not 
only on firms, source countries, and commodities, but also on the tariff schemes (e.g., 
an RTA or MFN scheme) applied to these imports. Namely, as is consistent with the 
above definition on firm-level trade creation, we can identify whether a particular 
import from RTA members is under an RTA or MFN scheme. Regardless of either the 
Vinerian country-level version or our firm-level version, the reduction of tariff rates by 
introducing RTA preferential rates is a major source of “trade creation” for RTAs. Our 
dataset enables us not to include the start of imports from RTA members under MFN 
schemes as trade creation, which is not motivated by such tariff reductions. To the best 
of our knowledge, none of the above-mentioned country-level studies examine trade 
creation/diversion under different tariff schemes. 
Our paper is related not only to the above-mentioned traditional literature on trade 
creation/diversion but also to some other types of literature. First, several papers have 
recently examined the mechanisms for the survival of international transactions (e.g., 
Besedes and Prusa, 2006a, 2006b; Gorg et al., 2012; Nitsch, 2009; Esteve-Perez et al., 
2013; Gullstrand and Persson, 2015). These studies find, for example, that international 
transactions are likely to survive when they are related to exports by more productive 
firms, countries with larger GDPs, or geographically closer countries. In terms of 
analyzing the survival of imports from RTA non-members (i.e., firm-level trade 
diversion), our paper is related to this literature, but it is different in terms of analyzing 
the roles of RTA rates and MFN rates separately. Such differentiation is important 
because they have different effects on the survival of imports from non-members, as 
shown in this paper. 
Second, our paper is also related to some firm-level studies on the choice of tariff 
schemes when exporting. These studies employ the data that can identify tariff schemes, 
                                                   
4 The aggregated version of trade data according to tariff schemes has been employed in several 
papers, including studies on the determinants of the utilization rates of preferential trade and the 
effects of preferential utilization on prices. The former kind of studies include Bureau et al. (2007), 
Cadot et al. (2006), Francois et al. (2006), Manchin (2006), and Hakobyan (2015). Those studies 
find that the utilization of preferential schemes is higher in the products with larger tariff margins, 
larger volumes, and less restrictive rules of origin. Examples of the latter kind are Cadot et al. (2005), 
Olarreaga and Ozden (2005), and Ozden and Sharma (2006), which find the rise of export prices 
after RTA schemes are utilized. 
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such as preferential schemes or MFN schemes. Employing these unique survey data, for 
example, Takahashi and Urata (2010) and Hayakawa (2015) examine the role of firm 
size in terms of the number of employees. By employing the firm-level data on the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) utilization for exporting apparel products to 
Europe from Bangladesh, Cherkashin et al. (2015) structurally estimate their model on 
the firms’ choice of tariff schemes. However, these studies only focus on trade with 
partner countries in terms of preferential schemes and thus do not shed light on trade 
diversion. Also, although the datasets used in these studies do not include trade for all 
firms and industries, our dataset covers all commodity trade in Thailand. 
Third, there are some studies on the effects of tariff reductions on extensive and 
intensive margins. For example, employing product-level import data in the United 
States, Debaere and Mostashari (2010) examine changes in the effect of tariff reductions 
on the extensive margin (positive exports or zero) and find that tariff reductions have a 
small effect on the extensive margin relative to the overall growth in international trade. 
Buono and Lalanne (2012) show the significant role of tariff rates on the number of 
exporters (extensive margin) and exports per firm (intensive margin) in France. On the 
other hand, we investigate the role of tariff rates on the firm-(product/country)level 
probability of importing (extensive margin) and firm-(product/country)level imports 
(intensive margin). Furthermore, we differentiate between the roles of RTA rates and 
MFN rates, particularly for the extensive margins. As mentioned above, we will show 
that these tariff rates have different effects on the start of imports from RTA members 
and the termination of imports from non-members. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides our 
conceptual framework on firm-level trade creation and diversion. Section 3 introduces 
our dataset and then provides an overview of firm-level trade creation and diversion in 
Thailand. Indeed, we believe that Thailand is a suitable importing country in which to 
examine the effects of RTAs on imports. As stated in Section 3, Thailand and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Thailand is a member, have 
actively terminated RTAs with countries outside ASEAN since the latter half of the 
2000s, which represents our sample period. As a result, Thailand’s imports from RTA 
partner countries under RTA schemes grew rapidly during that period. In Section 4, we 
report the results for our econometric analyses. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
This section discusses how MFN rates and RTA preferential rates affect the start 
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and exit of imports from RTA members and non-members. To simplify our discussion, 
we examine a firm’s imports of a homogenous product, in which the market structure 
represents perfect competition. That product is imported from two groups of countries: 
RTA non-member countries and future RTA member countries. We consider the imports 
at two time points. RTA is not available at the initial time, but RTA schemes are 
available at the later time. 
The possible unit import prices of product i at time t are given by 
𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀𝑀 = (1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑛𝑛, 
𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀𝑀 = (1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑚𝑛, 
𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑝𝑚𝑛. 
PS indicates the import price under tariff scheme S (i.e., an RTA scheme or an MFN 
scheme). MFN and RTA are MFN rates and RTA preferential rates, respectively. 
Subscripts n and m refer to non-member countries and member countries, respectively. p 
indicates c.i.f. prices (prices inclusive of costs, insurance, and freight), which are 
assumed to be time-invariant. For simplicity, we assume that the compliance costs of the 
rules of origin (Compliance) enter in an ad valorem fashion against c.i.f. prices. 
To consider the effects of tariffs, we categorize the import structure of firms into 
four cases, based on the import status at the initial time, as shown in Table 1. The first 
case is that a firm does not import a product from either member or non-member 
countries at the initial time. We do not discuss this case, since it is unfeasible to 
empirically examine all of the possible import patterns. Namely, since this case requires 
us to investigate non-importers at the initial time, we cannot investigate a particular set 
of firms. Similarly, sets of products and export countries cannot be restricted either. As a 
result, even if some firms to be examined can be specified, we need to examine whether 
or not such firms start importing each of all products from each of all countries through 
changes in the tariff rates. Such an analysis is empirically unfeasible.5 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
The second case is that a firm imports a product from member countries but not 
                                                   
5 This difficulty may be the reason why there are few empirical studies on the determinants of the 
start of firm/country/product-level trade. In contrast, as listed in the introductory section, there are 
several studies on the determinants of exit because we can only restrict the estimation sample to the 
firm/country/product pairs that existed at the initial time. When examining the start of 
firm/country/product-level trade, some restrictions are necessary. For example, Fontagné et al. 
(2015) examine the firm/destination/product-level export probability by restricting the sets of firms 
and destination countries, and analyzing at the HS four-digit level rather than at the tariff line–level. 
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from any non-member countries. This case emerges when, even under the initial level of 
MFN rates, production costs and thus c.i.f. prices are lower for the product from 
member countries than those from non-member countries, i.e., pni > pmi. In this case, the 
introduction of RTA preferential rates only encourages firms to continue importing that 
product from member countries. If MFN rates are sufficiently high or RTA rates are 
sufficiently low, the applied tariff scheme for imports from RTA members changes from 
MFN to RTA. However, it does not generate imports from non-member countries, 
because pni > pmi. The same is true for any change or level of the MFN rates. In short, 
the firms’ import patterns do not change in this case. 
The interesting case is the third one, in which a firm does not import a product 
from any member countries, but it does import a product from non-member countries. 
This case becomes dominant if c.i.f. prices are lower in the product from non-member 
countries than those from member countries, i.e., pni < pmi. In this case, the firm imports 
that product from either non-member countries under an MFN scheme or member 
countries under an RTA scheme, depending on the level of MFN and RTA rates. In 
particular, if the RTA rates are sufficiently low compared with the MFN rates (including 
the compliance costs), the firm will start importing that product from member countries 
under an RTA scheme and stop importing from non-member countries. Namely, 
firm-level trade creation and diversion emerge. On the other hand, lower MFN rates will 
discourage such firms from switching the origin of their imports. 
The last case is that a firm imports a product from both member and non-member 
countries. Under the above setting, this case simply emerges if the c.i.f. prices are the 
same between products from member and non-member countries, i.e., pni = pmi. While 
the reduction of MFN rates does not change the initial import pattern, low RTA rates 
would encourage firms to stop importing from non-member countries and to switch 
their applied tariff schemes for imports from member countries from MFN to RTA.6 
Our empirical analysis basically focuses on the interesting case, i.e., the third case. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, it is unfeasible to empirically examine the first case. 
Furthermore, in the second case, tariff rates play a role of only strengthening the initial 
import pattern. On the other hand, in the third case, we will see firm-level trade creation 
and diversion at the same time through changes in the tariff rates. In particular, as 
                                                   
6 Furthermore, when assuming that this product is differentiated, this case will emerge if import 
prices from both types of countries are not sufficiently high and not very different. Also, if the 
product is not sufficiently differentiated, lower RTA rates may discourage the importing firms to 
continue their imports from non-member countries. On the other hand, low MFN rates may 
encourage the continuation of not only imports from non-member countries but also imports from 
member countries under MFN schemes. 
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mentioned above, symmetric patterns of tariff effects will emerge. Low RTA rates have 
positive and negative effects on the start of imports from member countries and the 
continuation of imports from non-member countries, respectively. In contrast, low MFN 
rates have the opposite effects. Also, it is feasible to empirically examine this case 
because we can restrict importers to those who imported from non-members but not 
from any RTA members, in the initial year. The products to be examined can also be 
restricted to those that were imported from non-members in the initial year. Lastly, the 
fourth case is also investigated, to some extent, in our empirical analysis. 
 
 
3. Data Overview 
This section provides an overview of firm-level trade creation and diversion in 
Thailand. After introducing our dataset, we will show that very few firms switch their 
import source countries from RTA non-members to RTA members. 
 
3.1. Data Source 
Our dataset is obtained from the Customs Office, Kingdom of Thailand. It 
represents transaction-level import data from 2007 to 2011 and covers all commodity 
imports in Thailand. In our sample period, we retain the consistency of the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) version for the product classification, 
i.e., HS2007. Our dataset includes the customs clearing date, HS eight-digit code, 
export country, firm identification code, tariff scheme (e.g., RTA, MFN, etc.), and 
import values in Thai baht (THB). We use the import data aggregated by years, in 
addition to the source countries, HS eight-digit codes, firms, and tariff schemes. We 
classify the tariff schemes into three categories, including the MFN and RTA schemes, 
as well as other schemes. The tariff payment for imports under “other schemes” is 
exempted on the basis of five categories: bonded warehouses, free zones, investment 
promotion, duty drawback for raw materials imported for the production of exports, and 
duty drawback for re-exportation.7 
As listed in Table 2, Thailand has ten RTAs in our sample period, most of which 
overlap in terms of their country coverages. Thailand has not only bilateral but also 
plurilateral RTAs with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India. With the members of 
ASEAN, of which Thailand is also a member, Thailand has at least five RTA schemes. 
In this paper, we call the following 15 countries “RTA member countries”: Korea, China, 
                                                   
7 See Appendix A for these five categories within “other schemes.” 
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Japan, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia. Except for Korea, where Thailand 
concluded an RTA in 2010, all of these countries have been RTA partner countries with 
Thailand at least since the beginning of our sample period, i.e., 2007. The other 
countries are called “RTA non-member countries.”8 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
Although Thailand has had RTAs earlier than our sample period, the significant 
use of RTA schemes for Thailand’s imports only started during our sample period. 
Figure 1 reports the imports under RTA schemes, in addition to their share of total 
imports. In this figure, the samples are restricted to observations in which any RTA rates 
are lower than MFN rates in 2007. In 2007, imports under RTA schemes remained at a 
small magnitude. The share of total imports was less than 1%. However, both the 
magnitude and share of imports under RTA schemes dramatically increased since 2008. 
The share rises to 16% in 2008 and to 31% in 2011. In sum, our sample period is the 
period when Thailand started to increase its imports under RTA schemes. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
3.2. Overview: Quantitative Analysis 
     We start from an overview of firm-level trade creation. Table 3 decomposes 
Thailand’s imports in 2011. For example, total imports are disaggregated into imports 
from non-members (i) and imports from members (ii). The latter imports represent 
approximately 60% of total imports in 2011. The case of (iv) shows that, among the 
imports from members, those in “eligible products” are larger. In this table, the eligible 
products are defined as products in which the RTA rates are lower than the MFN rates in 
                                                   
8 More precisely, all products do not necessarily have lower RTA rates than MFN rates in any RTAs. 
Furthermore, it depends on the RTAs and thus on the export countries which products can be 
exported to Thailand under lower RTA rates than MFN rates. Also, RTA preferential rates for some 
products become available many years after the RTAs have been in force. In this sense, “RTA 
member countries” should be classified by not only country but also by product and year. However, 
such a classification is too complicated from which to examine trade creation/diversion. Thus, we 
simply classify imports according only to the country of origin. However, in our econometric 
analysis, we impose some restrictions on exporter-product pairs based on RTA eligibility. The 
number of products with RTA rates lower than MFN rates, i.e., the number of eligible products, is 
reported in Appendix B. In this appendix, we also provide the product-level distributions of MFN 
rates, the lowest RTA rates, and their differences, i.e., the preference margin in 2009. 
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2011. Otherwise, the products are categorized as “ineligible products.” If multiple 
preference schemes are available (e.g., ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (AJCEP) and Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) 
when importing from Japan), the lower preferential rates are used in this categorization. 
The imports of eligible products from RTA members under RTA schemes only represent 
about 10% of total imports. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     We further decompose the imports of eligible products from RTA members under 
RTA schemes in 2011. In the cases of (viii) and (ix), we identify whether or not such 
imports existed in 2007 (the start year of our dataset). We find that almost all of such 
imports did not exist in 2007. On the other hand, as shown in the case of (x), most of the 
RTA users that did not import from members also did not import from non-members in 
2007. In other words, such firms are new importers during this period rather than 
switchers of import source countries from non-members to members. The switching 
importers can be found in the case of (xiii), which represents only 1% of all imports in 
Thailand. In sum, at least during our sample period, there are few firms that started to 
import a product from RTA members under RTA schemes by stopping their imports of 
that product from non-members, i.e., there was little firm-level trade creation. Almost 
all (future) RTA users were new importers (x). 
     Next, we provide an overview of firm-level trade diversion in Table 4. As in Table 
3, we decompose imports in 2007 and find that the share of imports from non-members 
was 40% (ii), which is the same as in 2011. Among these imports, 15% are in eligible 
products (iv). In this table, the eligible products are defined as those in which the 
preferential tariffs under at least one of the RTAs are lower than the MFN rates in any 
year during the period 2007–2011. For such imports of eligible products from 
non-members, we focus on those under MFN schemes (vi). Such imports from 
non-members under MFN schemes represent approximately 10% of total imports. 
About 40% of these imports (i.e., 4% of the 10%) are by firms that did not import the 
same products from members in 2007 (viii). And in this case, approximately 60% of 
these imports disappeared in 2011 (x). Almost all transactions categorized in (x) are by 
firms that also did not import from members in 2011 (xi). Namely, most of the firms 
that stopped importing from non-members did not start importing from members. 
Rather, they stopped their importing activity per se rather than switching their import 
sources. 
11 
 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis: Qualitative Analysis 
     This section conducts econometric analyses of firm-level trade creation and 
diversion. As mentioned in Section 2, we focus on firm-product pairs, in which firms 
import a particular product from non-members but not from RTA members in the initial 
year, i.e., case (iii) in Section 2. In particular, we examine the roles of RTA rates and 
MFN rates on the start of imports from RTA members under RTA schemes and the exit 
of imports from non-members. 
 
4.1. Trade Creation 
Setting the initial year as 2007, we examine the existence of imports from RTA 
members during the period 2008–2011. Specifically, we restrict the sample firm-product 
pairs to those that imported from any non-members, but did not import from RTA 
members, in 2007. Then, we examine whether a firm engages in importing a particular 
product from each member in each year under RTA schemes. We exclude the import 
transactions under the other schemes. The products are restricted to those in which the 
available RTA rates are lower than the MFN rates when importing from a certain 
member country in a certain year.9 
Our empirical model of firm choice for imports and utilizing RTA schemes is 
specified as follows. To take into consideration the fact that RTA users are always 
importers, we employ the Heckman probit model, whose framework is provided in Van 
de Ven and Van Praag (1981). The selection equation describes the firms’ decisions on 
whether or not to import a product from a member country in a particular year: 
𝑦𝐼𝑀
∗ ≡ max{𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀 ,𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅} = 𝐳𝐳 + 𝑢𝐼𝑀, 𝑦𝐼𝑀 = �1 if 𝑦𝐼𝑀∗ > 00 if 𝑦𝐼𝑀∗ ≤ 0.         (1) 
For simplicity, we omit firm, product, export country, and year subscripts. πMFN and 
πRTA are gross profits from importing under MFN and RTA schemes, respectively. A 
vector z includes various elements that affect gross import profits. A vector γ indicates 
the coefficients to be estimated. Namely, this equation indicates that firms choose to 
import if the gross profits from importing under either an MFN scheme or an RTA 
                                                   
9 If a firm imports from members under multiple schemes, we only use the observations for the 
scheme with the largest import values. 
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scheme become positive. uIM is a disturbance term. 
The elements in a vector z are selected on the basis of the simple conceptual 
framework in Section 2. The profits from importing from a particular member country 
will not be independent from the profits from importing from other member and 
non-member countries. In other words, it depends on the characteristics of all export 
countries. However, we simply assume that a vector z mainly includes MFN and RTA 
rates. These two kinds of tariff rates may have a more direct association with the 
imports from non-members and members, respectively, although the import profits from 
each country are simultaneously determined.10 As discussed in Section 2, we expect that 
higher MFN rates or lower RTA rates encourage firms to import from RTA members. 
We also introduce a log of export costs per container for the export country in order to 
control for the fixed costs of exporting on the export side.11 
Then, the resulting equation describes the firms’ decision on whether to use an 
MFN scheme or an RTA scheme: 
𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ ≡ 𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐱𝐱 + 𝑢𝑀𝑅𝑅, 𝑦𝑀𝑅𝑅 = �1 if𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ > 0,𝑦𝐼𝑀∗ > 00 if𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ ≤ 0,𝑦𝐼𝑀∗ > 0.    (2) 
A vector x includes the various elements that affect the difference between gross import 
profits under RTA and MFN schemes, and it is assumed to mainly include the 
preference margin. The larger margin will encourage firms to import under RTA 
schemes rather than under MFN schemes, as found in previous studies on the 
determinants of RTA utilization rates.12 We also introduce a log of the fees for the 
issuance of certificates of origin (CoOs) in the export country in order to control for the 
fixed costs of utilizing an RTA on the export side.13 A vector β indicates the coefficients 
to be estimated. uFTA is a disturbance term. This equation indicates that firms choose to 
import under RTA schemes if the associated gross profits are greater than those under 
MFN schemes. The disturbances in these two equations are assumed to be as follows: 
𝑢𝐼𝑀~𝑀(0,1), 𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑅~𝑀(0,1), corr(𝑢𝐼𝑀,𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑅) = 𝜌.                 (3) 
In addition, as the control variables in both of the z and x vectors, we include a 
log of total global imports at the firm-product level (ln total imports), a firm-level 
                                                   
10 If multiple preference schemes are available, the lower preferential rates are used for the import 
observations under an MFN scheme. For the import observations under RTA schemes, we use 
preferential rates in the corresponding RTA schemes. 
11 Fixed export costs will have a significant effect on importers’ profits if we take into consideration 
the matching between exporters and importers. See, for example, Sugita et al. (2015). 
12 See footnote 4. 
13 We do not introduce this variable into the selection equation, because of its high correlation with 
the export costs per container. Also see footnote 11. 
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dummy variable taking the value one if a firm becomes engaged in exporting (export 
dummy), a log of GDP, and a log of the geographical distance between the export 
country and Thailand. The former two firm-level variables are one-year lagged.14 Also, 
we include year fixed effects to control for the import country’s specific time-variant 
elements, such as demand size, for both vectors. Since our variable for CoOs fees is a 
time-invariant export country–specific variable, we do not include fixed effects for the 
exporting countries. Also, the export costs per container do not change much over time. 
Similarly, the reason for not including product fixed effects is because MFN rates, 
which are one of our main variables, do not change for almost all products (99%) during 
our sample period. The nature of this variable also implies that our estimation results for 
MFN rates come from the variations across products, not over time.15 
The results are reported in column (I) in Table 5. We can find the significant 
results in “Rho,” indicating the existence of selection bias in the estimates of the RTA 
use equation when estimating this equation using a simple probit model rather than a 
Heckman probit model. In the equation for imports, the coefficients for RTA and MFN 
rates are significantly negative and positive, respectively, which is consistent with our 
prior expectations. Namely, lower RTA rates or higher MFN rates encourage firms to 
start importing from RTA members. In the equation of RTA use, the coefficient for the 
preference margin is estimated to be significantly positive, as is also consistent with our 
expectations. Namely, when starting to import products with a larger preference margin 
for RTA members, firms are more likely to use RTA schemes than MFN schemes. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
The results for the other variables are as follows. First, firms are more likely to 
import from RTA members with lower export costs and then to utilize RTA schemes 
when importing from RTA members with the lower CoO fees. Second, larger-sized 
firms in terms of total imports are more likely to import from RTA members, but they 
are less likely to utilize RTA schemes when importing. Although we did not consider the 
                                                   
14 When specifying firm-level characteristics, we must rely on customs data-based measures, since 
we do not have information on turnovers, employment, or capital for the universe of Thai importers. 
15 All firm-level data, in addition to the data of MFN rates, are obtained from Customs, Kingdom of 
Thailand, as used in the previous section. The data on GDP, which is deflated by the GDP deflator, 
are drawn from the World Development Indicator. We obtain the data on geographical distance from 
the CEPII website. The data on export costs per container and CoOs fees are drawn from the Doing 
Business Database at the World Bank and Table 1 in Hayakawa et al. (2015). The basic statistics for 
our sample are provided in Appendix D. 
14 
 
existence of fixed costs for switching import sources in Section 2, larger-sized firms 
may be more likely to afford paying such costs. However, the result for RTA utilization 
is puzzling. When using RTA schemes when importing, firms only need to submit the 
CoOs prepared by the exporting firms to customs. Namely, importers always prefer to 
use an RTA if the exporters can afford to use an RTA scheme. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
why smaller-sized firms are more likely to utilize RTA schemes when importing. Third, 
another puzzling result is that non-exporters are more likely to import from RTA 
members and then to utilize RTA schemes. Fourth, firms are more likely to import from 
RTA members that are larger economically (i.e., in terms of GDP) or from the less 
distant members, but they are less likely to utilize RTA schemes when importing from 
such RTA members. 
We present one kind of robustness check on the above results. In the above 
analysis, we employ balanced panel data on imports from each RTA member by year. 
For example, the dataset includes observations for all years (i.e., 2008–2011) for each 
firm/product-RTA member country pair, even if the positive imports in the 
corresponding pair appear in the middle year (e.g., 2009) and disappear in a later year 
(e.g., 2010).16 However, the decision process by firms may be different before and after 
the first imports from members (at least in our sample period) begin. Therefore, in this 
robustness check, we drop the firm-product pairs from the estimation sample after those 
pairs record the first positive imports from any RTA member. The results are reported in 
column (II) in Table 5 and show the qualitatively same results as those in column (I).17 
 
4.2. Trade Diversion 
     Next, we examine the cessation of imports from non-members. Specifically, we 
examine whether the import transactions from non-members by firms importing a 
product from a non-member country, but not from any member countries in 2007, 
continue to exist during the period 2008–2011. The products are restricted to those in 
which the preferential rates of at least one RTA are lower than the MFN rates, as of 
2008. We estimate a simple probit model on the above-mentioned existence of import 
transactions from non-member countries. As in the above case for trade creation, the 
import profits from non-members are not independent from the import profits from RTA 
members.18 Again, we simply assume that the explanatory variables in this probit model 
                                                   
16 See Appendix C1, which introduces the structure of our dataset for trade creation. 
17 Appendix E reports the results of examining the start of imports from RTA members for the fourth 
case in Section 2. The results are similar to those reported in this subsection. 
18 In this sense, the disturbance in the model specified in (1) may be correlated with that in this 
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are the same as the z vector, except for the log of the export costs that was used as one 
of the excluded variables in the analysis on trade creation. Another noteworthy 
difference is that the lowest RTA rates among all of the available RTAs in Thailand are 
used as the variable for RTA rates. 
     The results are reported in column (I) of Table 6. As is consistent with our 
discussion in Section 2, the coefficient for MFN rates is estimated to be significantly 
positive, indicating that firms are more likely to stop importing products with higher 
MFN rates from non-members. In contrast, RTA rates have a significantly negative 
coefficient. Namely, firms are more likely to stop importing products with lower RTA 
rates. In Table 6, we find that firms are more likely to start importing from RTA 
members in the case of products with higher MFN rates or lower RTA rates. In 
particular, the larger difference between MFN rates and RTA rates encourages firms to 
import from RTA members under RTA schemes. Combining these results with those for 
imports from members, we could say that firms are more likely to switch import sources 
from non-members to members under RTA schemes when importing products with 
higher MFN rates or lower RTA rates. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
The other results are as follows. First, the significantly negative coefficient for 
“Total Imports” indicates that the larger-sized importers are better able to cope with 
various kinds of idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., demand shocks on the import countries) and 
thus they will continue importing from non-members. Second, the coefficient for the 
“Export dummy” is significantly positive. In the analysis for trade creation, we find a 
significantly negative coefficient for this variable. Therefore, we can say that exporters 
are more likely to exit from the import market per se rather than to switch import 
sources. Third, as found by Besedes and Prusa (2006b), the coefficient for the exporter’s 
GDP is significantly negative. A larger GDP in the export countries leads to the lower 
uncertainty of demand in their home countries and thus enables the exporters to 
continue devoting their productive resources to export activities. Last, the coefficient for 
distance is significantly positive, which is consistent with the result by Nitsch (2009). 
Trading with more distant countries obviously increases the uncertainty of the fixed 
trade costs and may discourage firms from continuing to trade. 
                                                                                                                                                     
probit model, according to the firm-product pairs. However, we simply make separate estimates of 
these two models on trade creation and diversion. 
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As in the case of trade creation, we present one kind of robustness check on the 
above results. Namely, we drop the firm-product pairs after they record their first import 
exit from any non-members because the decision-making process by firms may be 
different before and after the first such exit (at least in our sample period).19 The results 
are reported in column (II) in Table 6 and they show the same qualitative results as 
those in column (I). In particular, the coefficients for the MFN and RTA rates are 
estimated to be significantly positive and negative, respectively.20 
 
4.3. Intensive Margin 
In this subsection, we examine the magnitude of imports from RTA members under RTA 
schemes and those from RTA non-members.21 The former magnitude is explored by 
estimating the Heckman model. The selection equation is formalized, as in the outcome 
equation for the analysis of trade creation in Section 4.1. Namely, imports from an RTA 
member under RTA schemes can only be observed if the gross profits from importing 
under RTA schemes are greater than those from importing under MFN schemes. As in 
Section 4.1, this relationship is specified as follows. 
𝐱𝐱 + 𝑢𝐸𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑛𝐸𝐸 > 0.                                                     (4) 
Again, we omit firm, product, export country, and year subscripts for simplicity. The 
outcome equation is a simple linear equation: ln Imports = 𝐳𝐳 + 𝑢𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑛𝐸𝐸 .                                            (5) 
The dependent variable is the natural log of imports from an RTA member under RTA 
schemes. Here we do not include the log of export costs per container in the z vector, 
because the fixed costs for exports are not expected to affect the intensive margin 
(Helpman et al., 2008). Also, the MFN rates are not included in this analysis of the 
imports under RTA schemes in order to focus on the effect of corresponding tariff rates 
on the intensive margin.22 
The results are shown in the “Trade Creation” column in Table 7. The most 
important result in the outcome equation (i.e., “Intensive”) is that the RTA rates have a 
significantly negative coefficient. Namely, the imports of products with lower RTA rates 
                                                   
19 See Appendix C2, which introduces the structure of our dataset for trade diversion. 
20 Appendix E reports the results of examining the exit of imports from RTA non-members for the 
fourth case in Section 2. The results are similar to those reported in this subsection. 
21 We again focus on firms that import a particular product from non-members but do not import 
from RTA members, i.e., case (iii) in Section 2. 
22 Furthermore, for simplicity, we do not take into account the selection on whether or not to import 
in the estimation (i.e., the model specified in (1)) and the existence and magnitude of imports from 
non-members. The same is also true for the model that examines the intensive margin when 
importing from non-members. 
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are larger. The noteworthy results for the other variables are as follows. First, in the 
selection equation (i.e., “RTA Use”), GDP has a significantly positive coefficient, unlike 
the case of the outcome equation in Table 5, which takes into account the selection of 
importing. Namely, our results for the export country’s GDP in RTA utilization are not 
robust and they are unclear. Furthermore, the coefficient for GDP is significantly 
negative in the outcome equation. This result is not consistent with the typical results 
for gravity studies, though the dimension of analysis is different (i.e., firm-product level 
versus national level). Second, the significantly positive coefficient for “Total Imports” 
under “Intensive” will be a natural result. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
Next, the magnitude of imports from non-members is examined by estimating the above 
outcome equation by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. However, in contrast to 
the above analysis, RTA rates are not included in this analysis on the imports from 
non-members. Instead, we introduce MFN rates into the z vector. The results are 
reported in the “Trade Diversion” column of Table 7. Naturally, the coefficient for MFN 
rates is estimated to be significantly negative, indicating that the imports of products 
with lower MFN rates are larger. The other variables have coefficients similar to the 
case of “Trade Creation” in terms of signs. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Using highly detailed import data for Thailand, this paper examined firm-level 
trade creation and diversion of RTAs. Specifically, by focusing on firms that imported a 
particular product from non-members but not from RTA members in the initial year, we 
empirically investigated the start of imports from RTA members under RTA schemes 
and the cessation of imports from non-members at the firm level. Our findings can be 
summarized as follows. Economic mechanisms work in the firm-level trade creation and 
diversion of RTAs. Namely, firms are more likely to stop importing products from 
non-member RTA countries with lower RTA rates or higher MFN rates and to start 
importing such products from RTA member countries. The magnitude of firm-level 
imports from RTA members and non-members is larger when importing products with 
lower RTA rates and lower MFN rates, respectively. 
However, from the quantitative point of view, there are very few firms that switch 
import sources from non-members to RTA members. Most future RTA users are new 
18 
 
importers, i.e., firms that had never imported from either RTA members or 
non-members. Also, most of the firms that stopped importing from non-members do not 
start importing from members; instead, they stop their importing activity per se. In sum, 
firm-level switching of import sources rarely happens. Switching from non-members to 
members directly reduces the imports from non-members, whereas a rise in imports 
from members by new importers (at least directly) does not occur, though it may 
discourage existing importers to continue importing from non-members. Therefore, our 
result denoting only a few “switching importers” may be one of the reasons why 
existing studies at a country level do not find significant trade diversion, though it is 
unclear as to how far the results for Thailand can be generalized. 
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Table 1. Import Pattern 
From RTA Members From Non-members
(i) NO NO
(ii) YES NO
(iii) NO YES
(iv) YES YES
Import Status in the Initial Time
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Table 2. RTAs for Thailand during Our Sample Period 
FTAs Members Implementation
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
1993
Thailand-India FTA (TIFTA): Early harvest India and Thailand 2004
Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) Australia and Thailand 2005
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, China Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2005
Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (TNZCEP) New Zealand and Thailand 2005
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) Japan and Thailand 2007
ASEAN-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2009
ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA (AKFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Korea,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2010
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand,
Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam, and
Thailand
2010
ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2010
 
Source: Legal texts of RTAs 
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Table 3. Decomposition of Imports in 2011: Trade Creation (Million THB) 
Value Share
(i) Imports from non-members in 2011 2,798,638 0.42
(ii) Imports from members in 2011 3,873,102 0.58
(iii) of an ineligible product as of 2011 1,486,225 0.22
(iv) of an eligible product as of 2011 2,386,877 0.36
(v) Scheme of imports from members in 2011 = MFN 946,411 0.14
(vi) Scheme of imports from members in 2011 = Others 825,607 0.12
(vii) Scheme of imports from members in 2011 = RTA 614,860 0.09
(viii) Existence of import of that product from that member in 2007 = YES 59,741 0.01
(ix) Existence of import of that product from that member in 2007 = NO 555,118 0.08
(x) Existence of import of that product from non-members in 2007 = NO 395,772 0.06
(xi) Existence of import of that product from non-members in 2007 = YES 159,347 0.02
(xii) Existence of import of that product from non-members in 2011 = YES 115,684 0.02
(xiii) Existence of import of that product from non-members in 2011 = NO 43,662 0.01
(xiv) Total 6,671,740 1.00  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of Imports in 2007: Trade Diversion (Million THB) 
Value Share
(i) Imports from members in 2007 2,898,477 0.60
(ii) Imports from non-members in 2007 1,969,455 0.40
(iii) of an ineligible product as of any year during 2007-2011 1,237,313 0.25
(iv) of an eligible product as of any year during 2007-2011 732,142 0.15
(v) under Others 278,611 0.06
(vi) under MFN 453,531 0.09
(vii) Existence of import of that product from any members in 2007 = YES 259,421 0.05
(viii) Existence of import of that product from any members in 2007 = NO 194,110 0.04
(ix) Existence of that import from that non-member in 2011 = YES 84,233 0.02
(x) Existence of that import from that non-member in 2011 = NO 109,878 0.02
(xi) Existence of import of that product from any members in 2011 = NO 109,878 0.02
(xii) Existence of import of that product from any members in 2011 = YES 0.001 0.00
(xiii) Scheme of that import from members in 2011 = MFN 0.001 0.00
(xvi) Total 4,867,932 1.00  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 5. Trade Creation: Extensive Margin 
Import RTA Use Import RTA Use
ln (1+MFN rates) 0.547*** 0.247***
[0.022] [0.030]
ln (1+RTA rates) -0.534*** -0.225***
[0.053] [0.068]
Preference Margin 0.147*** 0.536***
[0.056] [0.104]
ln Total Imports 0.064*** -0.058*** 0.051*** -0.039***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
Export dummy -0.013*** -0.070*** 0.020*** -0.113***
[0.004] [0.010] [0.006] [0.018]
ln GDP 0.313*** -0.291*** 0.284*** -0.233***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.012]
ln Distance -0.188*** 0.550*** -0.152*** 0.573***
[0.006] [0.011] [0.007] [0.023]
ln CoO Fee -0.029*** -0.028***
[0.005] [0.010]
ln Export Cost -0.427*** -0.433***
[0.007] [0.009]
Rho -0.936 -0.914
[0.007] [0.014]
Chi-squared statistics 1014.7 1014.7
Number of observations 9,166,871 8,292,312
Censored observations 9,107,223 8,263,932
Uncensored observations 59,648 28,380
Log pseudolikelihood -318194 -168697
(I) (II)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. In all specifications, we include year dummy variables. 
 
 
  
27 
 
Table 6. Trade Diversion: Extensive Margin 
(I) (II)
ln (1+MFN rates) 0.280*** 0.459***
[0.021] [0.032]
ln (1+RTA rates) -1.143*** -1.131***
[0.105] [0.127]
ln Total Imports -0.055*** -0.057***
[0.001] [0.001]
Export dummy 0.164*** 0.116***
[0.004] [0.006]
ln GDP -0.053*** -0.044***
[0.001] [0.002]
ln Distance 0.028*** 0.037***
[0.003] [0.005]
Number of observations 851,572 347,253
Pseudo R-squared 0.0126 0.1243
Log pseudolikelihood -482312 -207913  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. In all specifications, we include year dummy variables. 
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Table 7. Trade Creation and Diversion: Intensive Margin 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
ln (1+MFN rates) -2.032*** [0.097]
ln (1+RTA rates) -2.946** [1.297]
Preference Margin 1.787*** [0.104]
ln Total Imports -0.015*** [0.004] 0.264*** [0.020] 0.168*** [0.003]
Export dummy -0.214*** [0.022] -0.240*** [0.085] -0.376*** [0.015]
ln GDP 0.100*** [0.009] -0.084** [0.035] -0.036*** [0.006]
ln Distance 0.442*** [0.028] 0.033 [0.104] 0.029** [0.013]
ln CoO Fee -0.150*** [0.010]
Rho 0.184 [0.073]
Chi-squared statistics 6.03
Number of observations 59,648 170,821
Censored observations 55,972
Uncensored observations 3,676
R-squared 0.0371
Log pseudolikelihood -20664
Trade Creation
RTA Use Intensive Intensive
Trade Diversion
 
Notes: “Coef.” and “S.E.” show coefficients and the robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In all 
specifications, we include year dummy variables. 
 
  
29 
 
Figure 1. RTA Imports for Thailand (Billion THB) 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Appendix A. The Other Schemes 
In addition to RTAs, there are five additional privileged schemes in which 
importing firms in Thailand can enjoy preferential tariff treatments; namely, bonded 
warehouses, free zones, investment promotion, duty drawback for raw materials 
imported for the production of exports, and duty drawback for re-exportation. While 
benefits under the first three are realized immediately at the time of importation, those 
under the latter two schemes are essentially the refund of the duties already paid, which 
is collected when exportation or re-exportation is achieved. The benefits offered under 
these five schemes, which may also vary among schemes, are different from those under 
RTAs, at least in the following six aspects. 
First, the beneficiaries are different. Under RTAs, beneficiaries can be any 
importer, no matter what the goods are used for. In other words, they can be either 
manufacturers for the domestic market, manufacturers for the export markets, traders 
that import and distribute goods to customers, or final users of the imported goods. 
Unlike RTAs, the beneficiaries under bonded warehouses, free zones, and duty 
drawback schemes are required to be firms that only import goods for their own 
production and exporting activities. For imports under investment promotion, the 
beneficiaries are mixed, depending upon the imported goods. For imports of machinery, 
the beneficiaries could be manufacturers for either the domestic or export markets. On 
the other hand, only manufacturers for the export markets benefit from the investment 
promotion scheme during the importation of raw materials. 
Second, the lists of eligible goods are different. Under RTAs, eligible goods can 
be any goods tagged within the inclusion list. In other words, subject to negotiations 
among RTA members, they can be raw materials, machinery, or final products. Unlike 
RTAs, eligible goods are mainly raw materials in most of the five schemes. Machinery 
to be used in the production process is ineligible under all schemes, with the exception 
of free zones and investment promotion. Imported goods to be used as final products are 
ineligible under all schemes. It is noted that duty drawback for re-exportation is 
applicable to any goods—either raw materials, machinery, or final products—provided 
that such goods do not undergo any transformation from the time they are imported until 
they are exported. 
Third, the extent of customs duty reductions is different. Under RTAs, while 
tariffs for a large portion of traded goods are totally eliminated, some remain non-zero 
subject to their sensitivity to liberalization and RTA maturities. Tariff reductions under 
the five schemes vary, but most of them are greater than those for RTAs. Tariffs for all 
raw materials imported under free zones, investment promotion, and bonded warehouse 
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schemes are virtually exempt. For machinery, imports under free zones are tariff free, 
whereas those under the investment promotion scheme may be either tariff free or 
subject to a 50% tariff reduction, depending upon the decision by the Board of 
Investment of Thailand. Under the duty drawback schemes, firms may ask either for a 
full refund, if the raw materials are imported for the production of exports, or for 
nine-tenths or the excess of one thousand Thai baht of the duty already paid, whichever 
is higher, if the goods are imported for re-exportation. 
Fourth, the benefits from the exemption of other duties are different. On top of 
tariff reduction, certain schemes grant additional duty privileges to firms. The 
exemption of excise taxes exists for goods imported under the bonded warehouse and 
duty drawback for raw materials imported for the production of export schemes. 
Privileges for firms in the free zones are among the best, since imported goods are free 
of tariffs, excise taxes, and value-added taxes. 
Fifth, the qualifications are different. Under RTAs, qualified goods are required to 
be produced in the RTA-member countries and meet the relevant originating criteria 
specified in the rules of origin. Failure to do so makes such goods unqualified and 
results in the denial of benefits under RTAs. On the other hand, this is not an issue for 
importations under the five privilege schemes. It means that the goods that have 
qualified for these schemes may be produced in and exported from anywhere in the 
world. 
Last, the burdens for the importers to prove eligibility are different. In order to 
claim benefits under the five schemes, importers are required to submit evidence of 
compliance to the authority in charge. The evidence of compliance includes a 
production formula, a necessity claim that explains why imports are preferred over 
locally produced goods, and other relevant documents. To some extent, this inevitably 
results in higher compliance costs. On the other hand, this evidence is not required for 
importers claiming preferential benefits under RTAs. The only evidence needed is the 
CoO issued by a competent authority in the exporting country. As a result, the burden 
and cost of proving eligibility under RTAs is imposed mainly on the exporters. 
In conclusion, the benefits offered and costs imposed vary among import schemes. 
Such differences may either encourage or discourage firms to switch their imports 
among RTAs, other privilege schemes, and MFN schemes. In addition to the lower cost 
of compliance, the broader coverage of eligible goods and the beneficiaries, who are 
able to claim preferential tariff treatments, are some of the advantages of import 
switching to RTAs. On the contrary, the extent of customs duty reductions, the offer of 
other kinds of duty reductions, and the goods’ originating status requirements are among 
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the main reasons why firms either switch to or remain in the other privileged schemes. 
Appendix B. Tariff Rates in Thailand 
 
Table B1. Number of Products with Lower Preferential Rates than MFN Rates 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
AANZFTA 5,963 5,963
ACFTA 2,415 2,415 4,897 5,893 5,893
AFTA 5,809 6,267 6,273 6,672 6,672
AIFTA 4,191 4,191
AJCEP 5,466 5,466
AKFTA 5,773 5,773
JTEPA 4,990 5,147 5,505 5,705 5,705
TAFTA 5,481 5,783 6,117 6,567 6,577
TIFTA 238 238 238 238 238
TNZCEP 5,482 5,784 6,148 6,635 6,656  
Source: Authors’ compilations 
 
 
Figure B1. Distribution of MFN Rates in 2009 
 
Source: Customs, Kingdom of Thailand 
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Figure B2. Distribution of the Lowest RTA Rates in 2009 
 
Source: Customs, Kingdom of Thailand 
 
Figure B3. Distribution of the Preference Margin in 2009 
 
Source: Customs, Kingdom of Thailand 
  
0
.5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
0 1 2 3 4 5
Lowest RTA Rates (%)
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2223
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
D
en
si
ty
0 50 100 150 200 250
Preference Margin (%)
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5365
34 
 
Appendix C. Construction of the Dataset for Our Estimations 
This appendix explains how we construct our datasets for econometric analyses. 
Such datasets for trade creation and diversion are introduced separately. 
 
C1. Dataset for Trade Creation 
We start by identifying the importers from non-members in 2007. Thus, we 
restrict the import data to the import transactions from non-members in 2007, in which 
we have information on firm IDs, export countries (Exporter), HS codes, and import 
values (Values). In this dataset, only observations with positive import values are kept. 
Next, using this information, we construct a list of import firm–HS code pairs that 
existed in 2007, an example of which is shown in Dataset 1 in Figure C1. Then, for each 
pair, we make a balanced panel dataset in terms of RTA member countries (15 countries 
in total) and years (2007–2011).23 As a result, we obtain the dataset shown in Dataset 2. 
Taking this dataset as the master data, we merge the data on imports from RTA members 
according to firm, HS code, export country, and year. Finally, while we put a zero value 
for the imports in the unmatched part of the master data, we drop the unmatched part of 
the data on imports from RTA members. As explained in Section 4.1, we further exclude 
some observations. 
 
Figure C1. Dataset for Trade Creation 
 
                                                   
23 More precisely, as mentioned in Section 3.1, 14 countries are included as RTA member countries 
during the period 2007–2009, in which Korea is not included. For 2010 and 2011, we have a total of 
15 countries. 
Firm ID HS code
1 XXXX
1 YYYY
3 ZZZZ
: :
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Firm ID HS code Exporter Year
1 XXXX Country 1 2007
1 XXXX Country 2 2007
1 XXXX : 2007
1 XXXX Country 15 2007
1 XXXX Country 1 2008
1 XXXX Country 2 2008
1 XXXX : 2008
1 XXXX Country 15 2008
1 XXXX Country 1 2009
1 XXXX : :
1 XXXX Country 15 2011
1 YYYY Country 1 2007
1 YYYY : :
1 YYYY Country 15 2011
3 ZZZZ Country 1 2007
3 ZZZZ : :
3 ZZZZ Country 15 2011
: : : :
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C2. Dataset for Trade Diversion 
When constructing the dataset for trade diversion, we first restrict our original 
dataset to include only the observations of imports from RTA non-members, as shown in 
Dataset 3 in Figure C2. Next, after deleting firm/HS code/exporter pairs that did not 
exist in 2007, we construct a balanced panel between the firm/HS code/exporter pair 
and year. The example is presented in Dataset 4. Notice that an observation for “Firm 
3-ZZZZ-USA” is dropped in Dataset 4 because of its non-existence in 2007. In this 
dataset, we put zero for “Values” in the newly created years. Then, we construct a list of 
firm/HS code pairs that have positive imports from RTA members in 2007, which is like 
Dataset 1 in Figure C2. Finally, we merge this list with Dataset 4, according to firm-HS 
codes. The unmatched part of the list is deleted. As explained in Section 4.2, we further 
drop some observations. 
 
Figure C2. Dataset for Trade Diversion 
 
 
  
Firm ID HS code Exporter Year Values
1 XXXX USA 2007 40
1 XXXX USA 2008 10
1 XXXX USA 2009 14
1 XXXX USA 2010 39
1 XXXX USA 2011 32
1 YYYY France 2007 54
1 YYYY France 2009 25
2 XXXX UK 2007 75
3 ZZZZ USA 2009 42
: : : : :
Dataset 3 Dataset 4
Firm ID HS code Exporter Year Values
1 XXXX USA 2007 40
1 XXXX USA 2008 10
1 XXXX USA 2009 14
1 XXXX USA 2010 39
1 XXXX USA 2011 32
1 YYYY France 2007 54
1 YYYY France 2008 0
1 YYYY France 2009 25
1 YYYY France 2010 0
1 YYYY France 2011 0
2 XXXX UK 2007 75
2 XXXX UK 2008 0
2 XXXX UK 2009 0
2 XXXX UK 2010 0
2 XXXX UK 2011 0
: : : : :
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Appendix D. Basic Statistics 
 
Table D1. Basic Statistics in Trade Creation 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Statistics for (I) in Table 6
Import 9,166,871 0.007 0.080 0 1
RTA Use 59,648 0.062 0.240 0 1
ln (1+MFN rates) 9,166,871 0.089 0.072 0.000 1.297
ln (1+RTA rates) 9,166,871 0.013 0.028 0 1.140
Preference Margin 9,166,871 0.083 0.080 0.000 2.657
ln Total Imports 9,166,871 17.407 2.721 4.143 26.412
Export dummy 9,166,871 0.694 0.461 0.000 1.000
ln GDP 9,166,871 29.307 2.038 25.839 32.882
ln Distance 9,166,871 7.609 0.884 6.264 9.198
ln CoO Fee 9,166,871 1.917 1.271 0.000 3.932
ln Export Cost 9,166,871 6.444 0.417 5.748 7.473
Statistics for (II) in Table 6
Import 8,292,312 0.003 0.058 0 1
RTA Use 28,380 0.042 0.201 0 1
ln (1+MFN rates) 8,292,312 0.089 0.072 0.000 1.297
ln (1+RTA rates) 8,292,312 0.013 0.028 0 1.140
Preference Margin 8,292,312 0.082 0.080 0.000 2.657
ln Total Imports 8,292,312 17.320 2.733 4.143 26.412
Export dummy 8,292,312 0.686 0.464 0.000 1.000
ln GDP 8,292,312 29.294 2.036 25.839 32.882
ln Distance 8,292,312 7.606 0.885 6.264 9.198
ln CoO Fee 8,292,312 1.920 1.271 0.000 3.932
ln Export Cost 8,292,312 6.445 0.417 5.748 7.473
Statistics for Table 8
RTA Use 59,648 0.062 0.240 0 1
ln Imports 59,648 10.668 2.644 0 20.669
Preference Margin 59,648 0.084 0.076 0.000 0.750
ln Total Imports 59,648 18.464 2.399 7.641 26.412
Export dummy 59,648 0.773 0.419 0.000 1.000
ln GDP 59,648 31.522 1.476 25.839 32.882
ln Distance 59,648 7.946 0.528 6.264 9.198
ln CoO Fee 59,648 1.977 0.974 0.000 3.932  
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Table D2. Basic Statistics in Trade Diversion 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Statistics for (I) in Table 7
Import Exit 851,572 0.739 0.439 0 1
ln (1+MFN rates) 851,572 0.087 0.071 0.000 1.297
ln (1+RTA rates) 851,572 0.005 0.015 0 0.049
ln Total Imports 851,572 17.497 2.687 4.143 26.412
Export dummy 851,572 0.702 0.457 0 1
ln GDP 851,572 31.917 1.339 22.101 33.806
ln Distance 851,572 8.972 0.603 7.339 9.889
Statistics for (II) in Table 7
Import Exit 347,253 0.568 0.495 0 1
ln (1+MFN rates) 347,253 0.089 0.073 0.000 1.297
ln (1+RTA rates) 347,253 0.008 0.018 0 0.049
ln Total Imports 347,253 17.373 2.729 4.143 26.412
Export dummy 347,253 0.668 0.471 0 1
ln GDP 347,253 31.975 1.327 22.298 33.806
ln Distance 347,253 8.970 0.604 7.339 9.889
Statistics for Table 8
ln Imports 170,821 11.737 2.481 0 22.885
ln (1+MFN rates) 170,821 0.085 0.069 0.000 1.297
ln Total Imports 170,821 17.832 2.274 7.080 26.412
Export dummy 170,821 0.693 0.461 0 1
ln GDP 170,821 32.037 1.261 24.522 33.806
ln Distance 170,821 9.001 0.573 7.339 9.889  
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Appendix E. Extensive Margin for Case (iv) 
This appendix reports the estimation results for firms categorized into the fourth 
case in Section 2. Specifically, we examine the start of imports from RTA members and 
the exit of imports from RTA non-members. Explanatory variables are the same as in 
Section 4. For the former analysis, we keep the firm-product pairs that existed in 2007 
in the dataset for trade creation, which is explained in Appendix C1. As in the baseline 
analysis in Section 4.1, we do not drop the firm-product pairs after such pairs record 
their first positive imports from any RTA member, because all pairs existed in 2007 in 
this estimation. The estimation results are reported in the “RTA Members” column. For 
the latter analysis, we keep the firm-product pairs, in which any positive imports from 
RTA members were recorded in 2007, in the dataset for trade diversion, as explained in 
Appendix C2. And as in the analysis for the robustness check in Section 4.2, we drop 
the firm-product pairs after they record their first exit of imports from any non-member. 
The estimation results are reported in the “RTA Non-members” column. 
 
Table E1. Extensive Margin for Case (iv) 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
ln (1+MFN rates) 0.644*** [0.023] 0.383*** [0.050]
ln (1+RTA rates) -0.611*** [0.042] -0.513*** [0.190]
Preference Margin 0.287*** [0.037]
ln Total Imports 0.078*** [0.001] -0.080*** [0.001] -0.011*** [0.002]
Export dummy 0.015*** [0.005] -0.114*** [0.007] 0.033*** [0.010]
ln GDP 0.456*** [0.002] -0.417*** [0.003] -0.099*** [0.003]
ln Distance -0.344*** [0.006] 0.596*** [0.007] 0.036*** [0.006]
ln CoO Fee 0.001 [0.002]
ln Export Cost -0.345*** [0.007]
Rho -0.980 [0.002]
Chi-squared statistics 3315.24
Number of observations 2,342,424 149,922
Censored observations 2,217,284
Uncensored observations 125,140
Pseudo R-squared 0.0628
Log pseudolikelihood -411539 -95809
RTA Members RTA Non-members
RTA UseImport
 
Notes: “Coef.” and “S.E.” show coefficients and the robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In all specifications, we include year dummy variables. 
 
